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ARTICLES
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR
HMO TREATMENT DENIAL
John A. Humbach'
A child is seriously ill. She will not live much
longer if steps are not promptly taken. However, her
parents' HMO has denied approval for the treatment
that she needs. According to her doctor, the treatment
has a good chance of helping. It could extend her life by
months or even years. The treatment is, however, ex-
pensive, more than her parents can pay. Also, the initial
cost is just the beginning. As long as the child lives she
will need expensive care. It is a burden that the HMO
does not want to take. So, a few days from now-maybe
less-she will lapse into unconsciousness and, soon af-
ter, she will pass away. Her parents ponder this and
think: "We've paid premiums to that HMO for years. If
she dies now, because of this denial, somebody ought to
pay; the law should make somebody pay for letting our
daughter die."
I. INTRODUCTION
WHffEN PEOPLE DELIBERATELY do things that are
almost certain to cause death, and someone dies as a result,
prosecutions for homicide are normally appropriate. However,
the administrative conduct of health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) seems to be an exception. Unwarranted delays and de-
nials of medical treatment are not prosecuted even in cases
where the HMO personnel must have known that their actions
t J.D. summa cur laude, Ohio State University (1966). Professor of Law,
Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New York.
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would lead to death or grievous bodily harm. This article con-
siders the basis for this exception.
Homicide can be committed by commission or by omis-
sion-by affirmatively doing a lethal act or by omitting to do an
act that is necessary to preserve another's life.' There is, how-
ever, an important legal difference between the two: In order for
a fatal omission to be considered a crime, the omitter must have
had a legal duty to act,2 and the victim's death must result from
a breach of that duty.3 Such legal duties may arise in various
ways. For example, a legal duty to provide care is imposed on
the parents or legal guardian of a child. Such a legal duty may
also be created by contract, for example when a person agrees
to provide care for another.6 Consider the following case:
1 See People v. Burden, 140 Cal. Rptr. 282, 289-92 (Ct. App. 1977); see also
Commonwealth v. Hall, 78 N.E.2d 644,647 (Mass. 1948); Territory v. Manton, 19 P.
387, 392-93 (Mont. 1888); Biddle v. Commonwealth, 141 S.E.2d 710, 714-15 (Va.
1965) (collecting numerous cases and treatises). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AusTN W. Scor, JR., CRInmNAL LAW 202-12 (2d ed. 1986); JOSHuA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDiN CRIMINAL LAW 89 (2d ed. 1995) (providing an overview of liability
by omission).
2 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (re-
quiring proof of the legal duty); Albright v. State, 280 So. 2d 186, 190-91 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1973) (upholding demurrer to indictment that failed to allege the status relation-
ship giving rise to the duty); People v. Oliver, 258 Cal. Rptr. 138, 142 (Ct. App.
1989) (noting that there is no legal duty to render aid in absence of a special relation-
ship); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01(1), (3)(b) (Official Draft 1962) (com-
menting that "a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law").
3 See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 86-89; see also Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054
(Md. 1979); People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (Mich. 1907) (stating that
"the duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation. It must be
a duty imposed by law or by contract, and the omission to perform the duty must be
the immediate and direct cause of death").
4 See Jones, 308 F.2d at 310 (describing "at least four situations in which the
failure to act may constitute breach of a legal duty," namely, a statutory duty of care,
a status relationship to another, a contractual duty of care, and a voluntary assump-
tion of care while secluding the victim); see also DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 89-91
(describing legal duties arising from statutory duty, status relationship, and contrac-
tual obligations).
5 See, e.g., Jones, 308 F.2d at 310-11; People v. Burden, 140 Cal. Rptr. 282
(Ct. App. 1977) (sustaining a murder charge based on a parent's failure to feed an
infant); People v. Abraham, 629 N.E.2d 148, 153-54 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) (sustaining
convictions for murder and aggravated battery based on parent's failure to take af-
firmative action to protect children from an abusive live-in boyfriend); Common-
wealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 613 (Mass. 1993); State v. Norman, 808 P.2d
1159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding manslaughter conviction for parent who
failed to perform legal duty to care for his son).
6 See People v. Montecino, 152 P.2d 5, 13 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (finding
that the legal duty to care for another may be created by contract or moral duty); Peo-
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D was the guardian of his young nephew. As such, D
was responsible for the child's care. One day, D heard
his nephew fall in the bathtub. Running to check, D
found the child still alive, but face down in the water. It
was obvious to D that, unless he acted fast, the child
would almost certainly drown. However, at this crucial
moment, D recalled that he was his nephew's sole heir.
With this financial thought in mind, D did not take the
actions that would probably have saved his nephew's
life. As a result, the boy soon drowned. In summary,
seeing a chance to gain a financial advantage at the ex-
pense of another's life, D omitted to do an act that he
had a legal duty to do and, by that omission, he hastened
the death of the person to whom he owed the legal duty.
In deciding not to save his nephew, D clearly committed a
homicide by omission.7 He had a legal duty to act, he breached
the duty, and the child died as a result. The uncle's motivation
to gain a financial advantage is obviously not an acceptable ex-
cuse for letting his nephew die. Indeed, financial motivation
seems, if anything, to aggravate the seriousness of his crime.
Suppose now that, trying to reduce its medical costs, an
HMO breaches a legal duty to one of its subscribers. It breaches
this duty by wrongfully denying treatment benefits that would,
if timely provided, have preserved the subscriber's life; the sub-
scriber dies as a result. How is such a case legally different
from that of the uncle? Certainly there seem to be some salient
similarities. In both cases, there has been a deliberate breach of
a legal duty to provide essential care. In both cases, the lethal
ple v. Flayhart, 523 N.Y.S.2d 225 (App. Div.) (holding that guardians were guilty of
criminal negligence for failing to care for the retarded brother decedent), aftd, 553
N.E.2d 657 (1988); Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339, 1344 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (holding defendant guilty of murder for agreeing to provide for a 92-year
old and then letting him starve to death, knowing he had no other way to get food);
Davis v. Commonwealth, 335 S.E.2d 375, 378 (Va. 1985) (holding that defendant
accepted sole responsibility for the total care of her mother and that she had a legal
duty to provide the care).
See sources cited supra notes 1-6; see also Pinkerton v. State, 784 P.2d 671,
677 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); People v. Stanciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201, 1211 (IMl. 1992)
(noting that parents have an affirmative duty to protect their children from threat of
murder and holding that neglect of this duty imposes liability by reason of account-
ability); State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147, 153 (W.Va. 1996) (finding that "knowing
failure to take reasonable steps" to prevent deprivation that resulted in a child's death
constitutes murder).
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omission was inspired by a motive to secure a financial advan-
tage, even at the expense of human life. In both cases, someone
has died due to the breach of duty.
There may, of course, also be salient factual differences
between the two cases. For example, medical patients who are
so ill that they die from lack of treatment are often so close to
death that they would soon die anyway, even with all possible
care. By contrast, the case of the avaricious uncle seems to pre-
suppose that the young nephew had a long life ahead of him,
provided only that he was saved from drowning. This is, how-
ever, a difference without a legal distinction. Criminal liability
for causing death is not relieved by the victim's pre-existing
health condition, or the fact that the victim was going to die
anyway.8 "Life at best is but of short duration" 9 and, given the
inevitability of eventual death, the law is clear that "[m]urder is
never more than shortening of life,"' 0 even if only by a day." It
is, moreover, always a characteristic of omission-homicide
cases that there are other causes of death than the omission
alone. What makes fatal omissions into crimes is, precisely, the
defendant's wrongful failure to avert such other causes.
The HMO case presents another potentially salient differ-
ence from that of the avaricious uncle. They differ in respect to
the origin and scope of the legal duties in question. The HMO's
duty is contractual and is subject to stipulated exceptions while
the uncle's duty is rooted in a status relationship and is rela-
tively unconditional. However, despite these differences in the
origin and scope of the legal duty, once it is shown that the duty
has in fact been breached, the cases would seem legally the
same. That is, assuming the HMO breached its contractual duty
by refusing to authorize timely care, the IMO and its decision-
making personnel would seem to be in exactly the same legal
position as the avaricious uncle-criminally liable for the death
8 See People v. Morgan, 79 Cal. Rptr. 911, 913-14 (CL App. 1969) (holding
appellant guilty of murder for causing the victim to die of a heart attack); State v.
Malley, 366 P.2d 868, 873 (Mont. 1961) (allowing conviction if the "spark of life is
extinguished by a wrongful act"); cf. Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
487 (Ct. App. 1983) (referring to superior court judge's conclusion that homicide is
the shortening of life since everyone sooner or later will die).
9 State v. Smith, 34 N.W. 597, 601-02 (Iowa 1887).
0 People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 358 (Cal. 1966).
1 See People v. Moan, 4 P.2d 545,548 (Cal. 1884) (stating that it is homicide
even if the victim has "a tenure upon life that cannot possibly continue for a day").
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that results. 12 Death-by-omission should be the same thing le-
gaily no matter who happens to be the omitter.
To my knowledge, no HMO entity or personnel have ever
yet been criminally prosecuted for wrongful delay or denial of
treatment authorization. It may, however, be only a matter of
time before such prosecutions are attempted. Already there is a
growing interest in civil actions for the harms that ensue when
people, relying on HMOs, suffer or die because benefits are de-
nied. 13 There is, moreover, considerable disquiet about the fed-
eral limitations on HMO liability that were enacted by Congress
in the Employee's Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).14
However, the ERISA exemptions do not apply to criminal
laws.' 5 In many cases, criminal prosecutions may therefore be
the only effective avenues of redress.
In any case, criminal sanctions may actually work better
than mere civil damages to motivate HMOs to authorize the
medical treatments that their subscribers are contractually enti-
tled to. One of the biggest disadvantages of allowing civil dam-
ages against I-IMOs is that the companies can simply shift the
burdens of those "penalties" back to the subscribers, in the form
of higher premiums. For the HMO, the amounts paid out as
damages in lawsuits become just another cost of doing business.
As a result, civil damages for wrongful treatment denials may
actually work against the interests of the HMO's subscribers
and patients, increasing premiums and diverting scarce re-
sources away from medical care into judgments and lawyers'
'
2 See infra Parts I and IV.
1 For a prediction that "HMOs may replace big tobacco companies as the
prime target of the nation's trial lawyers," see David G. Savage, Cost-Cutting Conse-
quences: An HMO Liabilio Case is Being Closely Watched by the Lant'ers Who
Targeted Tobacco Companies, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 30. See also Chad Bowman,
Special Report: Health Care Outlook 2000, 68 U.S.L.W. 2411, 2411-12 (2000) (ob-
serving that "the common law is evolving to allow patients to receive compensation
for injuries caused by HMOs" and that "fl]iability protection for managed care con-
tinues to be the battleground for the coming year"); Richard A. Hinden & Douglas L.
Elden, Liability Issues for Managed Care Entities, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (1990)
(discussing potential liability for HMOs and PPOs with regard to provider selection
and utilization management); Linda V. Tiano, The Legal Implications of HMO Cost
Containment Measures, 14 SETON HALLLEGIS. J. 79 (1990) (describing liability theo-
ries that can arise when HMOs deny benefits causing patients' injury or death).
'4 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (stating that, with certain exceptions, laws
relating to any employee benefit plan are superseded by ERISA).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) (1994) (specifying that ERISA does not super-
sede "any generally applicable criminal law of a State").
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fees. When people subscribe to HMOs, what they are primarily
seeking is quality medical care, as needed, not a right to get
cash "compensation" after the fact, when life-or-death treat-
ments have been denied. 16 Money is a poor recompense for a
permanently impaired quality of life or the loss of life itself. It
little serves the person denied benefits, or his surviving family
and loved ones, to let an HMO get off with merely paying dam-
ages, which it can pass on to subscribers, instead of delivering
the benefits it has promised in its contract. 17
The legal agreements that people make with HMOs are no
ordinary commercial contracts. The due performance of these
agreements can be vital to life itself. As long as H1MOs are able
to shift the costs of their breaches, it may never be possible to
minimize the number of wrongful IMO denials. The only way
to prevent HMOs from shifting the penalties for wrongful deni-
als is to impose a cost on wrongful denials that the HMO cannot
shift. This is, of course, the classic function of the criminal
law-to impose costs on bad behavior that offenders cannot
shift. A civil defendant may shift the cost of a monetary judg-
ment, but a criminal defendant cannot "shift" a prison sentence.
Although criminal punishment is a dramatic response to
administrative errancy, the fact remains that it is the response
prescribed by law for cases where people's conduct proves
deadly or causes serious bodily harm. 18 In the social debate
about the role of HMOs, our nation's commitment to criminal
punishment as a tool of social policy must be recognized as part
of the background. In any case, the deterrent impact of criminal
penalties can scarcely be doubted: A potential for criminal
prosecutions would give HMO decision-makers a strong incen-
tive to treat subscribers right, avoiding delays and unwarranted
16 "In choosing a health plan, consumers say that quality of care is their great-
est concern...." Report to Congressional Requesters, Consumer Health Care Infor-
mation: Many Quality Commission Disclosure Recommendations Are Not Current
Practice, GAO Rep. No. GAO/HEHS 98-137, at 18 (Apr. 30, 1998) (report of Ber-
nice Steinhardt, Director, Health Serv. Quality & Pub. Health Issues).
17 As stated piquantly by Oliver Wendell Holmes, the idea "stinks in the nos-
trils" that a person who makes a promise need feel no compulsion to perform, pro-
vided the person is willing to pay legal damages. 0. W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the
Law, in PmILosoPY oF LAW 169, 171 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 5th ed.
1995).
18 Indeed, 38 states and the federal government currently prescribe the death
penalty for lethal conduct under certain aggravating circumstances, such as when
multiple victims occur. See State By State Death Penalty Information (visited Nov. 3,
2000) <http:llwww.deathpenaltyinfo.orglfirstpage.html> (Death Penalty Info. Ctr.).
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denials of treatment authorization. In addition, with prosecu-
tions a possibility, the public could feel much more secure
against wrongful medical care denials in any situation where the
patient's life might be shortened or health seriously compro-
mised.
In sum, while there are many possible approaches to the
regulation of HMOs, t9 the most straightforward approach may
be simply to enforce the rules we already have, the existing
rules of criminal law, the rules to which our society turns rou-
tinely to address a wide range of harmful activities. First, the
criminal law has the advantage of subjecting wrongful treatment
denials to a penalty that cannot be shifted back to subscribers.
Second, the criminal law is not superseded by ERISA, so the
current federal barriers to civil lawsuits would not stand in the
way. Third, as will be described below, 20 criminal prosecutions
offer advantages with respect to proof. Medical decisions and
judgments are necessarily discretionary, and it may be almost
impossible for a civil plaintiff to demonstrate in an individual
case that economic considerations played a role, much less an
improper role, in an HMO's decision to deny benefits.2' In a
criminal prosecution, by contrast, the needed evidence can be
obtained by such well-tested prosecutorial techniques as, for
example, offering leniency to subordinates in exchange for tes-
timony against their superiors, the individuals directly responsi-
ble for forming HMO policies. Finally, as will also be outlined
below, the criminal law on lethal and other injurious activities is
rather clear. The only real questions seem to be factual. Did the
HMO refuse to authorize treatment benefits in a situation where
there was a legal duty to approve and provide them promptly?
Were the HMO's decision-makers aware of the risks imposed
19 See John V. Jacobi, Canaries in the Coal Mine: The Chronically Ill in
Managed Care, 9 HEALTm MATRIX 79, 106-26 (1999) (summarizing a variety of pro-
posed and enacted regulatory measures). It is doubtful, however, that regulatory
measures can have much effect since they are "always a step behind the latest busi-
ness practice," while I-IMO cost containment methods "are simply too complex and
subtle to be easily addressed by rigid regulations." Id. at 120.20 See infra Part IV.C.
21 "Even in those few cases in which there have been legal claims [against
HMOs], lawyers find that obtaining critical information from a plan is akin to getting
gold bars out of Fort Knox." The Menace of Managed Care. A Guide to How Avoid-
ance, Denial and Control Can Result in Patient Harm, Before the Subcomm. on
Health & Env of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (Oct. 28, 1997)
[hereinafter Menace of Managed Care] (prepared statement of Linda Peeno, M.D.),
available in LEXIS (Fed. News Serv.).
20011
HEALTH MATRIX
on the patient? Was the patient's life shortened or health im-
paired as a result?
This article will, in Part II, first provide a brief examination
of the economic pressures that market forces bring to bear on
HMOs and their decision-making personnel. The objective is to
show how the natural effect of normal market forces is to exert
a constant pressure towards treatment delays and denials, par-
ticularly in the cases of elderly and chronically ill patients. Part
III will provide an overview of the existing criminal law as it
applies to situations in which death results because someone has
violated a legal duty to provide medical treatment. In Part IV,
the question of the requisite mental culpability will be dis-
cussed. Finally, after concluding that the criminal law provides,
in its present state, a rather clear basis for homicide prosecu-
tions of HMO personnel who authorize lethal treatment denials,
a short Postscript will consider some further policy implications
of HMO homicide prosecutions.
II. THE PROBLEM OF "NET-NEGATIVE"
PATIENTS
In the past couple of decades, HMOs and other managed
care firms have taken on a dominant role in the health care
field, with for-profit HMOs now accounting for nearly two-
thirds of the total HMO market.22 Typically, these corporations
have acquired the power to make essentially final decisions
about who receives medical care, what kinds of care they re-
ceive, and when they can receive it.23 However, "[l]ike other
22 "Between 1985 and 1998 the proportion of HMO members enrolled in
investor-owned plans increased from 26% to 62% .... " David U. Himmelstein et al.,
Quality of Care in Investor-Owned vs Not-for-Profit HMOs, 282 JAMA 159, 159
(1999). Half or more of privately insured Americans are enrolled in HMOs. See John
E. Ware, Jr. et al., Differences in 4-Year Health Outcomes for Elderly and Poor,
Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-for-Service Systems, 276 JAMA
1039, 1039 (1996); see also William H. Nelson, Customers Demand Managed Care,
HEALTHcAREFIN. MGMT., Aug. 1995, at 38 (stating that "about 66 percent of insured
Americans are enrolled in HMOs and other forms of managed care plans"). "Ihe
defining feature of an HMO is receipt of a fixed fee for each patient enrolled under
the terms of a contract to provide specified health care if needed." Pegrain v. Her-
drich, 530 U.S. 211, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2149 (2000), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 24-29.
2 See, e.g., Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D. N.J.
1989) (noting that the Plan Administrator "retains ultimate authority to grant or with-
hold benefits"); Menace of Managed Care, supra note 21; Linda Peeno, Managed
Care Ethics: The Close View (last modified May 30, 1996)
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risk-bearing organizations, HMOs take steps to control costs,"
and "[t]hese cost-controlling measures are commonly comple-
mented by specific financial incentives to physicians, rewarding
them for decreasing utilization of health-care services ....
Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently recognized in Pegram v.
Herdrich, "no HMO organization could survive without some
incentive connecting physician reward with treatment ration-
ing."'2 With this economic need for rationing in mind,26 the
Court held that, under ERISA, 27 HMO treatment decisions do
not have to be made "solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries." 2
8
The obvious attraction of giving physicians incentives to
refrain from prescribing treatments is that doing so cuts down
the HMO's medical costs. As the Supreme Court observed, cut-
ting down medical treatment costs does not necessarily increase
medical risks-in fact, the Court noted, less treatment may
sometimes even lead to less medical risk, for instance by cutting
down the hazards of unnecessary surgery.29 However, unless our
current levels of medical treatment are, on the whole, more
risky than they are beneficial, it seems almost inevitable that
less medical treatment will lead to more overall risk. This con-
clusion is, moreover, supported by some disturbing empirical
evidence, which shows that rationing by HMOs may be in-
creasing the medical risks to various classes of patients.
<http://vw.harp.org/peeno.htm> (commenting that the IMO system claims the
right to be the mechanism for the most serious of ethical decisions: determining who
gets medical care).24 Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2149.2' Id. at 2150.
26 An additional concern was to avoid a judicial "upheaval" Id. at 2156.
27 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994); see Pegramn, 120 S. Ct. at 2155-59 (ex-
plaining conclusion that HMOs are not acting as fiduciaries).
2" Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2151 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994)). The
Court reached this conclusion by reasoning that HMO treatment decisions are not "fidu-
ciary acts," as that term is used in ERISA. See id. at 2152, 2157-58. If treatment deci-
sions were considered to be fiduciary acts subject to ERISA, then the applicable stan-
dard for HMO treatment denials would be as defined in 29 U.S.C. §I 104(a)(1). Not-
withstanding the Court's holding in Pegram, the physician-employee's decisions
would still, of course, be subject to ordinary medical malpractice standards, which
would continue to apply under state law. See id. at 1257-58. Ultimately, then, what
Pegram denies is that an injured patient has "a further defendant to be sued" in a
federal ERISA action brought directly against the IMO, which "might have a deeper
pocket than the physician." Id. at 2158.
29 See id. at 2150.
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For example, in the fall of 1996, the Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association (JAMA) reported an extensive study of
the medical outcomes for patients who had been treated in
HMOs. 30 The study concluded that "elderly and poor chroni-
cally ill patients had worse physical health outcomes in HMOs"
than under traditional insurance plans.31 For example, "[t]he
elderly treated in HMOs were nearly twice as likely to decline
in physical health over time. ' 32 By contrast, younger, healthier,
and financially better-off patients "did at least as well in HMOs
as in the [fee-for-servicel plans." 33 Other studies have generally
confirmed these results: While HMOs serve the "average,
healthy enrollee" about as well as traditional health insurance,
they usually appear to provide "worse outcomes.., for vulner-
able groups (i.e., the seriously ill, the mentally ill, and the
poor). 34 For anyone familiar with the elementary laws of eco-
nomics, this difference in medical outcomes should come as no
surprise.
First, consider the context. Most large HMOs are publicly
traded on national stock exchanges and, as such, their securities
are in daily competition with those of other corporations. Their
financial results are closely scrutinized and compared, by Wall
Street analysts and others. This public market activity means
that HMO executives are under steady pressure to keep medical
30 See Ware, Jr. et al., supra note 22, at 1042-47.
-3'Id at 1039.
12Id. at 1044.
33 Id. at 1046. In traditional or "fee-for-service" insurance plans, the insurance
carrier pays or reimburses for treatments ordered by the patient's doctor or health care
provider, but does not directly take a role in selecting providers or deciding on treat-
ments. See Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2148-49 (explaining operation of traditional fee-for-
service medical care). As the Court explained the crucial economic difference be-
tween HMOs and fee-for-service plans: "In a fee-for-service system, a physician's
financial incentive is to provide more care, not less, so long as payment is forthcom-
ing... in an MO system, a physician's financial interest lies in providing less care,
not more." Id. at 2149. In both systems, the "check" on these financial self-interest
influences is the physician's professional obligation to act with "reasonable medical
skill and judgment in the patient's interest." Id In both, too, the adequacy of the phy-
sician's professional obligation to counter the economic influences "has been chal-
lenged." Id.
3 Himmelstein et al., supra note 22, at 159 (citing prior research where worse
outcomes appeared in eight out of 10 studies). The unfavorable comparisons that
emerge from studies such as these have apparently spurred HMOs into action. Ac-
cording to Himmelstein et al., more and more plans are refusing to release the data on
which such studies are based. See id. at 163 (noting that 41 plans refused to release
data in 1997 while 155 plans refused in 1998).
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costs down and profits up. Otherwise, the price of the HMO's
stock will fall and the jobs of its managers will be in jeopardy.
When compensation packages are tied to profits or include
stock options in the HMO's securities, the decision- makers
have an even greater personal interest in the financial success of
their companies and their market valuations. The market does
not reward them for saving lives at stockholder expense.
35
Looking at the world through the eyes of a rational HMO
executive, the company's clientele can be divided into two
groups: First, there are the subscribers who will probably pay
more in future premiums than they will cost the HMO in future
medical services.36 This is the "net-positive" clientele. The
other group is "net-negative." It contains the subscribers who
will probably cost more in future medical services than they
will ever pay in future premiums. Members of the net-negative
group include the most seriously ill, those who have only a
small chance of recovery, as well as the chronically ill people
whose diseases are both lingering and expensive to treat. The
"net-negatives" are perhaps typically, though not always, eld-
erly. Young or old, however, they are the subscribers whose
medical prognoses make it improbable that they will ever be
anything but unprofitable business for the HMO, a net financial
drain on its bottom line for the rest of their lives. They are not
the kind of customers that a rational HMO manager would nor-
mally want to have.
By tallying up and correlating the medical diagnoses, prog-
noses, treatments, and outcomes of the HMO's subscribers, the
actuarial staff of an IMO can make fairly reliable estimates of
who does and does not fall in the "net-negative" group. Then,
whenever a subscriber requests approval for expensive treat-
ments, the HMO's medical-review staff can check the sub-
scriber's file and make a straightforward monetary calculation.
If the calculation shows that the subscriber will probably turn
out to be "net-positive," then it is in the HMO's economic inter-
est to promptly approve payment for the requested medical
treatment. This will keep the subscriber happy and, so, the
HMO will more likely retain the subscriber's business. Given
3. As one commentator has stated: "IThe financing system at the heart of
managed care is at war with its care-giving potential when it comes to the chronically
ill:' Jacobi, supra note 19, at 107.
36 All future amounts being appropriately discounted to present value to ac-
count for the "time-value of money."
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normal economic incentives, it is no surprise that the JAMA
study reported that younger, healthier people generally did well
under HMO systems.
37
The matter is, however, entirely different in cases where
the HMO's prognosis-based calculations would show that the
subscriber will probably turn out to be "net-negative." It would
not be at all in the HMO's economic interest to extend the lives
of net-negative patients. That would just prolong a losing
proposition. The financial problem for the HMO is far greater
than merely being unable to recoup the immediate out-of-pocket
treatment costs. For many serious diseases, such as certain
forms of cancer, prompt and comprehensive treatment can pro-
long the patient's life very substantially. If timely diagnosis and
treatment extends an ailing patient's life by, say, five years,
those five years might mean additional millions of dollars in
treatment costs to be borne by the HMO. Consequently, when
an HMO gives prompt and comprehensive treatment to the
chronically ill, it risks taking on a stream of financial costs that
can go on indefinitely. In terms of HMO economics, this can
mean a tremendous increase in the lifetime cost of a subscriber
who is already a net drain on the HMO's finances. The eco-
nomic incentive to avoid aggressive diagnosis and time-critical
treatments of certain kinds of ailments is therefore obvious.
Economically rational HMO managers know that their
company's stock price depends on the bottom line. They know
that every dollar spent on a net-negative patient is one less rea-
son why the HMO's securities should command their current
prices on the national stock exchange. With jobs and personal
wealth ultimately on the line, the economically rational HMO
manager can hardly help wondering how to minimize, some-
how, the financial burdens posed by the HMO's net-negative
subscribers. The chief financial question that they present for
the HMO is: How long?
What particularly exacerbates this somber economic reality
is the fact that medical decisions are necessarily discretionary
and never exact. Medical professionals can, in complete good
faith, differ substantially as to what therapies are called for or
37 See Ware, Jr. et al., supra note 22, at 1042-47, discussed supra at text ac-
companying notes 33-34.
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necessary in a particular case. 38 When this intrinsic indefinite-
ness is combined with the pressures to minimize the net-
negative clientele, a potent and scary synergy can emerge. Es-
pecially in cases of serious illness, there are ample leeways
within which to conceal an economic biasing or tilt against an
HMO's net-negative subscribers. It is not so easy for an objec-
tive outsider to say with confidence that a given delay or denial
was motivated by financial, as opposed to medical, considera-
tions. Adding to the cover is the fact that only a relatively small
delay in testing or treatment can make a life-or-death difference
in a medical outcome.3 9 If a company implements its cost-
containment measures by means of subtle signals and hidden
incentives within the plan, a deliberate policy to selectively de-
lay or deny benefits would not necessarily be obvious to per-
sons familiar only with one or a few isolated treatment deci-
sions. In short, a quiet and low-key bias against treatment
authorizations to the net-negative clientele would be relatively
hard to detect medically, but it could have a very buoyant effect
on the company's bottom line. This is a tempting combination.
Even though treatment biases might be difficult to detect in
isolation, however, they would tend to be felt in the aggregate,
showing up for example in comprehensive surveys such as the
38 According to one of the principal authors of the annual Dartmouth Atlas of
Health Care, "there is no national consensus about the 'best practice' of medicine"
and "little systematic evaluation of the relationship between medical services and
health outcomes." Medical Necessity. From Theory to Practice, Before the Senate
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 106 Cong. (Mar. 2, 1999) (prepared
testimony of John E. Wennberg, Director, The Center for the Evaluative Clinical
Sciences, Dartmouth College), available in LEXIS (Fed. News Serv.). The "failure to
evaluate the outcomes of care means substantial disagreement and controversies exist
concerning what actually works." Medicare: Its Context and Evolution, Hearings
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 106 th Cong. 1999 (testimony of John E.
Wennberg, M.D., M.P.H.), available in LEXIS (Fed. News Serv.). The Dartmouth
Atlas shows that, "on a per-enrollee basis, spending varies substantially among re-
gions in the United States, even after adjustment for differences in illness and price."
Id. However, "[t]he results challenge the view that regions with higher levels of per
capita spending provide higher quality care. Indeed, the opposite may be the case."
Id. "[More Medicare spending does not translate into longer, or better, life." Id.39 See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 626 (8th Cir. 1997) (involving a
patient with "warning signs" who died of an undiagnosed heart condition a few
months after his IMO physician, who had a financial incentive to minimize referrals,
declined to refer him to a specialist); see also Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2147 (describing
how patient suffered a burst appendix and peritonitis, a life-threatening ailment, due
to an 8-day delay in testing an abdominal mass); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co.,
716 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D. N.J. 1989) (noting that "time was of the essence with re-
spect to the treatment").
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JAMA-reported research referred to earlier.40 The inferior
medical outcomes registered by elderly and poor chronically ill
patients in HMOs might be entirely a matter of coincidence,
with no relation to the market incentives that surround HMOs,
or they may be a result of deliberate policy choices. Whether or
not intentional, however, the effect is the same. It is an effect
that coincides exactly with the sort of decision bias that would
well serve an HMO that is trying to cut its losses from net-
negative patients. Assuming that HMO managers behave in an
economically rational way, such a bias with respect to the eld-
erly and chronically ill would be a normal and expected effect
of ordinary market forces and incentives.
In some ways these economic realities faced by HMOs are
similar to those that apply to traditional "fee for service" insur-
ance, but HMOs are in a particularly strong position to deal
with these realities. Under fee-for-service plans, the insurance
company is more at the mercy of the patient's own doctor or
health care provider. The doctor or provider makes the treat-
ment decisions, and the insurance company pretty much has to
pay for whatever treatments are ordered. Even with a growing
tendency towards enhanced utilization reviews and other cost-
containment measures in the fee-for-service sector, the fact re-
mains that a fee-for-service insurer leaves health care providers
with far more independence and subjects them to much less di-
rect pressure to keep treatment costs down. In fee-for-service it
is the doctor's own professional judgment that generally con-
trols medical decisions, not the insurance company's.
By contrast, it is both the genius and the great weakness of
HMO-type managed care that final treatment decisions are re-
served to the ones paying the bills. Its strength is that it keeps
the costs down, but its weakness is that it eliminates the checks
that are inherent in the old and arguably less "efficient" fee-for-
service system.41 "[I]nducement to ration care goes to the very
40 See Ware, Jr. et al., supra note 22, at 1042-47, and text accompanying notes
22-23 & 30-34.
41 "Each method [HMOs and fee-for-service] creates an unfortunate incentive:
a physician receiving a fee for each service has an incentive to run up the bill by fur-
nishing unnecessary care, and an HMO has an incentive to skimp on care (once pa-
tients have signed up and paid) in order to save costs." Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d
683, 684 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, CJ., dissenting), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211, 120 S.
Ct. 1243 (2000). See also supra text accompanying notes 32-33; Jacobi, supra note
19, at 97, 103-05 (describing how and why HMOs are institutionally predisposed to
engage in "stinting," i.e., denying patients medially appropriate care).
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point of any HMO scheme ' 42 and, as doctors and other health
care providers come to depend more and more on HMOs for
their own personal livelihoods, they will naturally feel stronger
economic disincentives to press for medical tests and treat-
ments.43
By resort to various techniques, such as "economic creden-
tialing" of physicians, secret bonuses to deter expensive treat-
ments,44 utilization "profiling" and "capitation" (paying doctors
a set annual amount per patient), HMOs have proven quite
adept at keeping the most important decisions about treatment
expenditures to themselves4 5 This is fine for those subscribers
who are generally in good health and thus likely to be a future
profit source, so the HMO will want to keep them happy. It is,
however, not so fine for the patient who needs a time-critical
medical treatment but whose HMO would be financially better
off if the patient were already deceased.
To state the problem bluntly, there is a potentially lethal
economic flaw in the HMO concept. The flaw is that the final
say on whether a person gets life-extending treatment is con-
signed to an entity that can have a strong economic interest in
seeing the subscriber dead, as soon as possible. The shorter the
lives of the chronically ill, the less the HMO will have to pay
for their care. No one would think it fair to hold trials before
judges who have personal financial stakes in the outcomes. Yet,
this is precisely the way that the HMO concept is structured.
That is, arguably at least, a very serious flaw.4 6
42 Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2150.
43 See generally Menace of Managed Care, supra note 21.
4 See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that HMO
breached its fiduciary duty by not disclosing its use of "financial incentives that were
designed to minimize referrals" to specialists). See generally Edward B. Hirshfeld,
Should Third Part), Paoors of Health Care Senices Disclose Cost Control Mecha-
nisnis to Potential Beneficiaries? 14 SsroN HALL LEoIS. J. 115 (1990) (concluding
that HMOs should disclose).4 5 See Hirshfeld, supra note 44, at 117-18. Lamented the attorney, represent-
ing the patient in Pegran v Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000), doctors
"can receive an annual bonus for not ordering diagnostic tests." Savage, supro note
13, at 30. His client had suffered a burst appendix and life-threatening peritonitis due
to a misdiagnosis and an 8-day delay in testing an abdominal mass. See id.; see also
Pegran, 120 S. Ct. at 1247.46 See Jacobi, supra note 19, at 131-37 (suggesting partial capitation and other
"mixed" systems, that use managed care-based cost containment incentives along
with fee-for-service provisions, for cases of especially expensive treatment needs).
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It can be equally argued, to be sure, that this feature in the
HMO concept is not a flaw at all. The recent growth of HMOs
is apparently due in major part to the hope that they can provide
health care services at less societal expense. A key part of their
strategy for doing this is that they combine the roles of decision
maker and bill payer, which gives the HMO both the incentive
and the ability to say "no" to expensive medical treatment. In
purely economic terms, this represents the great advance of
HMOs over the old fee-for-service system. A disproportionate
share of national medical spending goes for people in their last
few months of life, a substantial skewing of resources to people
who are about to die anyway. 47 The HMOs' enhanced ability to
say "no" to costly life extension is perhaps (depending on your
viewpoint) the biggest service that they provide to society. By
being systematically disposed to say "no" more often, HMOs
have the ability to keep down the insurance premiums of
healthy people while, at worst, shortening lives of those already
near death. If you do not mind looking at things this way, then
IMOs are the way to go.
Actually, I believe that, to date at least, most HMO manag-
ers would not look at things in this way.48 What saves us from
these hard economic imperatives may be something that femi-
nist psychologist Carol Gilligan has called the "awesome power
47 A study in the New England Journal of Medicine reported that roughly 30%
of Medicare expenditures were spent on patients in the last year of life, with the final
60 days accounting for about one-half of that final year's spending and the last 30
days accounting for about 40%. See James D. Lubitz & Gerald F. Riley, Trends in
Medicare Payments in the Last Year of Life, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1092, 1092-95
(1993). These figures remained "virtually the same from 1976 through 1988." Id. at
1094; see also Richard A. Knox, Care at End Not as Costly as Assumed, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 15, 1993, at 1. These figures for Medicare coverage, however, do not
include most of the cost of nursing home care, which is "an important service for the
elderly," and therefore probably understate significantly the total medical costs in-
curred in the last months of life. Lubitz & Riley, supra, at 1095. The 31% of Medi-
care spending would translate to about 10-12% of total national health care spending
occurring the last 12 months of life.
48 For a vigorously argued and less sanguine view of the current state of HMO
care, see Menace of Managed Care, supra note 21. See also the less sanguine view of
Dr. David Himmelstein, a principal author of one of the HMO performance studies
referred to in supra note 22, who reportedly stated, after an HMO industry spokes-
woman accused him of "confusing 'analysis and ideology'," "[m]y bias is that for-
profit H.M.O.'s kill people," quoted in Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Report Say Profit-
Making Health Plans Damage Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1999, at A18.
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of the irrational., 49 Because of this "awesome power," the as-
sumptions of economic rationality made by classical economics
are overstated caricatures; they do not reflect actual human be-
havior in situations where powerful non-rational concerns also
come into play. For example, most people probably place a very
considerable value on not being killers, even if they can get
away with it, or on not doing things that shorten others' lives,
even when the countervailing economic incentives are great.
50
To the extent that Gilligan's "awesome power" prevails, we
may expect that HMO managers will be exceptionally able to
resist the strong economic incentives that they have to quickly
cut losses when subscribers turn net-negative. The problem is,
however, that this exceptional and "irrational" resistance to cut-
ting the company's losses may gradually erode over time. Even
the most conscientious HMO management will not last very
long if it does not keep the costs down, the revenues up, and the
premium rates in line with those of their competitors. They are
ineluctably bound to respond "rationally" to normal market
49 Carol Gilligan, Preface to MAPPING THEMORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION
OF WOMEN'S THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND EDUCATION xvi (Carol Gil-
ligan et al. eds., 1988).
"' Actually, it is arguable whether conduct is properly termed
"irrational" when people act on non-economic values such as those mentioned in the
text. See RICHARD S. LAzARus & BERNICE N. LAZARUS, PASSION AND REASON:
MAKING SENSE OF OUR EMOTIONS 203-08 (1994). While some behavior may seem
irrational when compared with what an economically rational person would do, from
a different perspective the same behavior might be seen as perfectly rational. The
reason for the apparent discrepancy is that economic values are only a subset of all
human values and, therefore, economic rationality is only a subset of total rationality.
From the larger perspective, the main origin of economically irrational be-
havior (other than pure misjudgment or inadvertence) is the fact that economic values
and objectives are not, for most people, ends in themselves but only means to other
ends, other values that people are motivated to pursue in life. Because economic re-
sources are crucial to obtaining many of the most important things in life-food,
shelter, sexual partners, esteem, etc.-economic values generally provide a conven-
ient proxy for the things that people are really seeking in market transactions. For this
reason, the economists' postulate that people act rationally to pursue economic values
is a very convenient simplifying assumption about human behavior, one that works
well for many analytical purposes and allows the creation of robust behavioral mod-
els to compare otherwise incommensurable values.
However, like all simplifying assumptions, this economic assumption can
generate models that produce significant discrepancies from real life in some cases.
For example, the value most people place on not being killers, discussed in the text,
may produce seriously "irrational" economic behavior. It can cause people to deviate
from model-predicted behavior because it is a value that is not, in many contexts,
readily commutable to the economic proxies (dollars) that economic theory otherwise
uses so deftly and successfully to compare incommensurables.
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pressures or else risk being replaced by people who will. Market
discipline is not sentimental and, if the tenets of free market
economics are valid, the only HMOs that will survive in the
longer run will be those whose managements behave like eco-
nomically rational decision-makers. As competitors seek ad-
vantage through moral slippage on the question of serving the
net-negatives, economic pressures to meet the competition will
fall on everyone else, as well.
In any case, if one of the very purposes of HMOs is to re-
duce the overall costs of health care, to prevent the "waste" of
health care dollars, then at least some treatment decisions will
have to be based, at least partly, on dollars and cents calcula-
tions; it will not be possible to keep medical need and financial
considerations entirely separate, even in principle. Moreover, as
the economic circumstances of their companies become tighter
in the face of competitive winnowing, HMO managers may find
themselves ever less at liberty to make hard economic sacrifices
in order to extend human life. In short, it would be naive to as-
sume that the HMO industry can remain satisfactorily immune
to the normal laws of economics that drive our free market
economy in general, and make it so strong. As long as HMOs
are run by self-interested rational individuals, these economic
pressures must somehow eventually be felt.
In making public policy, the normal market forces to which
HMOs are subject cannot be ignored. What the existence of
these forces suggests is this: The position of conscientious
HMO managers is not unlike the position of manufacturers in
"dirty" industries who want to stop polluting but cannot unilat-
erally make anti-pollution expenditures without giving their
competitors a crucial cost advantage. In these situations, the en-
forcement of anti-pollution laws is the way that we level the
playing field, so that those who want to do the right thing can,
and those who do not, will. Just as a manufacturer may need
anti-pollution laws to remain competitive while doing the right
thing, the conscientious HMO manager also needs the enforce-
ment of laws, such as laws against homicide, to prevent less
scrupulous rivals from gaining a competitive advantage by in-
appropriately mixing up questions of medical necessity with
issues of pure economics.
To conclude, if the usual assumptions underlying the free
market system hold true, then HMOs are under constant eco-
nomic pressure to curtail the net cash drain they face every time
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one of their subscribers goes "net-negative." Even with the best
of intentions, an HMO simply cannot, in a competitive market,
lavish its assets on net-negative subscribers if its competitors
are not doing likewise. Because economically-biased deferrals
or denials of treatment would not always be easy to detect, it
seems logical to attach the most serious of consequences to
those that are. Homicide is a category of crime that applies
when people behave in ways that shorten the lives of others.
When a patient's life is shortened by a wrongful refusal to
authorize medical treatment, the offense of homicide is legally
indicated.
III. VIOLATING THE DUTY TO PROVIDE
MEDICAL CARE
It certainly seems morally questionable for health insurers
to deny coverage for life-saving medical treatments just because
they cost "too" much. But can a wrongful denial of treatment on
economic grounds be a crime as well? If it is a crime, moreover,
whose crime is it?
The discussion in the remainder of this article will focus on
the possible criminal liability of HMO personnel who, in the
course of their jobs, make decisions to deny medical treatment
authorizations and foreseeably hasten the deaths of persons who
depend on HMOs for treatment. The goal is to provide an out-
line of the basis on which prosecutions could be legally war-
ranted by the already existing, generally accepted framework of
criminal law.
From the standpoint of the HMO, a failure to authorize life-
sustaining care to a person who needs it is an "omission," 51 and
a mere omission is not a crime unless there is a legal duty to
act.5 2 However, by virtue of their contracts with their subscrib-
ers, IMOs do have a legal duty to act; they have a legal duty to
authorize and provide payments for certain medical care-not
any and all prescribed care, perhaps, but at least some medical
care. It is therefore a crucial threshold question: What are the
scope of and limits on an HMO's legal duty to provide medical
care, especially in life-threatening situations?
51See infra Part III.B.
52 See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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A. Outer Limits of the Duty
A leading case on a physician's duty to provide medical
services to patients in life-or-death situations is Barber v. Supe-
rior Court.'3 Compared with the physician's duties, an HMO's
duties may be markedly less extensive since they can presuma-
bly be limited and tailored in the subscriber agreement.5 4 Nev-
ertheless, the Barber case is of interest; it would seem to supply
the outer limits of the HMO's potential duty.
The patient in Barber was a man who had suffered a car-
dio-respiratory arrest a short time after undergoing an abdomi-
nal surgery.55 He was revived and placed on a life support sys-
tem.56 Three days later he was still deeply comatose, a state
from which he was "not likely" to recover.57 Tests and exami-
nations by specialists indicated that he had suffered severe brain
damage.58 Although not "brain dead, 59 he was in a vegetative
state that was deemed "likely" to be permanent.6° After consul-
tation with the patient's family, and on their instructions, the
doctors in charge "caused the respirator and other life-
sustaining equipment to be removed.",61 Two days later, they
removed the intravenous tubes that provided hydration and
nourishment.62 The patient died.
The question in Barber was whether the doctors could be
properly charged with murder and conspiracy to commit mur-
der.63 The lower court concluded as a matter of law that the
doctors' conduct, "however well motivated" and ethically
"sound" as a medical matter, was unlawful under California
law.64 Observing that homicide means simply the "shortening of
life by some measurable period of time," the lower court judge
51 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983). The case is the subject of an annota-
tion, see Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Homicide: Physician's Withdrawal of Life
Supports from Comatose Patient, 47 A.L.R. 4th 18 (1986).
54 See infra Part IU.C.
" Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
56 See id.
7 id.
5& See id.591 d. at488.
60Id. at 486.
61 id.
62 See id
63 See id. (citing CAL. PEN. CODE § 187 and § 182, respectively).
64 Id. at 487 (rejecting the conclusion of the magistrate).
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held that the doctors' intentional acts to remove the biological
necessities for life constituted murder.
6 5
The doctors could not, of course, legally claim to excuse
their actions merely on the ground that their motives were good
or beneficent. As the appellate court stated in Barber, "the law
is settled that motive is irrelevant to a determination of whether
a killing amounts to murder... ,,66 Nor did the circumstances of
the case bring it within any of the recognized categories of "ex-
cuse" or "justification."67 "Euthanasia," said the court, "is nei-
ther justifiable nor excusable in California." 68 Although the ap-
pellate court was evidently concerned about the "gap between
the statutory law and recent medical developments," 9 it none-
theless felt constrained to decide the case according to the "ex-
isting criminal law." 70 It is that "existing criminal law" that is of
interest here.
On the basis of its analysis of the existing law, the appellate
court in Barber ordered the criminal proceedings against the
doctors to be terminated.7' It held that the doctors did not, on
the facts of the case, have any further legal duty to provide
medical care to the patient at the time when the life-support was
removed.72 The general rule is, according to the appellate court:
"A physician has no duty to continue treatment, once it has
proved to be ineffective."73 With particular reference to life-
sustaining machinery, it said that "there is no duty to continue
its use once it has become futile in the opinion of qualified
medical personnel." 74 These conceptual limits on the doctor's
duty, "futile" and "ineffective," are both obvious and minimal.
A duty to help another cannot logically be breached once the
other is beyond help anyway. The Barber doctors did no wrong
by merely omitting to do things that would have served no pur-
pose at all.
The matter is not, however, quite so simple. For one thing,
biological uncertainty being what it is, the concepts of "ineffec-
65 id.
66 id.
67 See id.
68 Id.
69 Id.; see also id. at 488.
70 Id. at 487.
71 See id. at 493-94.
72 See id. at 493.
" Id at 491 (emphasis added).
74 Id. (emphasis added).
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tive" and "futile" are necessarily somewhat relative. As long as
basic physiological processes continue, revival remains a possi-
bility. Recently, an elementary school principal returned to
work two weeks after hospital doctors had declared him dead.75
A woman regained consciousness and was munching pizza after
16 years in a coma.76 Adding even further to these biological
uncertainties, the court in Barber seemed to define "futility" to
mean less than literal futility. The test, according to the court,
was whether further treatment would offer "reasonable benefit
to the patient., 7
7
For this purpose, the court invoked a sort of proportionality
analysis, whether the proposed treatment "has at least a reason-
able chance of providing benefits to the patient, which benefits
outweigh the burdens attendant to the treatment." 78 Thus, for
example, even "minimally painful or intrusive" procedures may
be unwarranted where "the prognosis is virtually hopeless for
any significant improvement." 79 Notably, however, the court did
not appear to think that burdens to persons other than the pa-
tient, such as burdens to the doctors or medical payors, had any
proper role in the determination. Only burdens to the actual pa-
tient, such as pain, were mentioned as proper considerations.
Where continuing medical treatment is of only "debatable
value,"80 the really crucial question may be: Who decides?
Whose job is it to weigh, with fatal finality, the benefits and
burdens of treatment to the patient? On this question, the Bar-
ber court stressed the primacy of patient autonomy:
"[W]henever possible, the patient himself should.., be the ul-
timate decision-maker." 8' Otherwise, the decision should be
75 See Steve Shoup, Man Breathes After 'Death' at Hospital, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Oct. 21, 1999, at Al; Scott Smallwood, Life 'as Usual' Precious Giftfor Princi-
pal, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Nov. 2, 1999, at Cl.
76 See Ben Fenton, Woman in Coma for 16 Years Meets Her Children, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 6, 2000, at 5; James Langton, The Day that a Sleeping
Beauty Woke Up, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 9, 2000, at 24; see also Adam
Gershenson, Tender Care, Courage and Top-Notch Grades, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1999, at B4 (noting that a woman returned to college after being declared dead
twice).
77Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491 (emphasis added).
78 Id.
79 Id. In these extreme cases, even a treatment course that is "only minimally
painful or intrusive" may be considered disproportionate. Id.
0 Id at 492.
81 Id.
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given to a person who would be "guided in his decision by the
patient's best interests.18
2
At one point the court appears to accept the view that the
doctors themselves might be authorized to determine the limits
on their own legal duties.83 However, the court also relayed the
worry that physicians' decisions may not always be free "from
possible contamination by self-interest or self-protection con-
cerns which would inhibit their independent medical judgment
for the well-being of their dying patients." 84 In the end, the
court states that a doctor's duty to provide treatment continues
until the "patient himself," or, at least, a surrogate preoccupied
with the patient's own interests, decides that further treatment is
futile.85 Nowhere did the Barber court suggest that economic
interests of the duty-holder are legitimate factors in determining
whether a patient should receive life saving medical care.
86
The relatively few other cases that comment on a medical
provider's legal duty to render care in end-of-life contexts gen-
erally accord with Barber in stressing the patient's interests as
controlling.87 Although doctors and patients presumably have
the freedom of contract to make different arrangements, the
Barber case appears to represent, in general, the terms of the
"contract that the law implies" between doctor and patient.
8 2 Id. at 493.
8' See id. at 491. "A physician is authorized under the standards of medical
practice to discontinue a form of therapy which in his medical judgment is use-
less...." Id. (quoting Dennis Horan, Euthanasia and Brain Death: Ethical and Legal
Consideration, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 363, 367 (1978)).
4 Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491 (quoting Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,
668 (1976)).
"' See id. at 492.
86 It should be noted how stark is the contrast between the stress on the pa-
tient's autonomy in Barber and the practice in the IMO context where, by design,
the patient turns over crucial treatment decisions to the HMO's personnel, whose
loyalties can be distinctly mixed and whose explicit goals can include reduction of
"utilization" and the "containment" of medical costs. See id. and cf. Doe v. Group
Hospitalization & Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993) (relying on Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. r. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-15 (1989), and recognizing that ERISA al-
lows medical plan fiduciaries to have conflicts of interest in which they might be
required to choose between the patient or the plan, but holding that where such con-
flicts of interest exist a court reviewing denials of coverage should give less defer-
ence than would otherwise be appropriate).
17 See Sarno, supra note 53, at 18 (collecting and summarizing these cases).
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B. Denying Medical Care: Omission or Act?
One of the most striking aspects of the analysis in Barber is
the way the court got itself to the question of whether the doc-
tors had a duty to continue treating their dying patient. The
court said that disconnecting the patient's vital life support was
only an "omission," not an affirmative act.88 This was a crucial
logical step: If the doctor's had done an "act" in disconnecting
the life support, they would almost certainly have violated the
law; everybody has a duty to refrain from doing acts to end an-
other's life. However, by holding the removal of the life support
to be an omission rather than an act, the court opened the door
to exonerating the doctors from the murder charges. For once
the conduct was held to be an omission the court was able to
invoke the "no duty, no guilt" analysis, already described. 89 It
could exonerate the doctors by a finding that, given the patient's
extreme condition, the doctors no longer had a duty to provide
life-prolonging treatment.
On the surface, however, it seems, at the very least, coun-
terintuitive to say the doctors did no "act" to disconnect the pa-
tient. They or their assistants surely had to pull out plugs, ex-
tract tubes, and deliberately cut off the flow of sustenance. Nev-
ertheless, the Barber court managed to conclude that this fairly
elaborate conduct constituted neither acts nor murder.9° Essen-
tially, the court's reasoning went like this: The operation of the
self-propelled life support devices in question was "compara-
ble" to manually administering injections or medication. To
cease manual injections or medication would merely be an
omission to provide further treatment, not an act. "Hence," the
court asserted, to disconnect a self-propelled device is "compa-
rable to withholding the manually administered injection or
medication." 91 On the basis of this assertion, it concluded that
the doctors' conduct was merely an omission to provide further
treatment, not an act.
The court's logic to distinguish acts and omissions may
seem a bit contrived, though it is probably no more contrived
8 See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
89 See supra text accompanying notes 71-87.
90 See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
91 Id.; see also Glanville Williams, Euthanasia, 41 MEDIcO-LEGAL J. 14, 21
(1973), reprinted in SANDFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 201 (6th ed. 1995); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 282 (1983).
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than the act/omission dichotomy itself. 92 A seemingly more se-
rious objection to the court's logic is that it appears to reach too
far: The very same reasoning that the Barber court used to ex-
onerate the doctors would appear to be equally apt to exonerate
almost anybody who might disconnect a dying patient from life
support. Suppose, for example, a mere interloper entered the
patient's room and cut off the machinery "just for fun," or that a
covetous relative did so in order to hasten an inheritance, or to
prevent its dissipation in medical bills. Should a court be re-
quired, at the trial of such a person, to treat the disconnection as
an omission and to dismiss the charges on the ground that, like
the doctors in Barber, the interloper or relative had no affirma-
tive duty to provide the patient with care? It is hard to believe
that a court would regard such behavior by the interloper or
relative as anything but "acts," plain acts of murder.
As was explained in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland,93 the in-
terloper situation is clearly distinguishable from that of the
doctors: "[W]hereas the doctor, in discontinuing life support, is
92 As should be apparent, almost any affirmative act can also be fairly readily
described as an omission, and vice versa. Does, for example, a truant student af-
firmatively "cut classes" or merely omit to attend them? Obviously, the student does
both. Examples such as these, which can be multiplied indefinitely, reveal the whole
act/omission distinction of the criminal law as being, in its essence, no more than a
beguiling sophistry, a linguistic construct that cannot in itself carry real analytical or
moral weight. Cf. Justice Scalia's analysis demolishing the similarly illusory
"harm/benefit" dichotomy in the constitutional law of takings, in Lucas . South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024-25 (1992).
The really crucial distinction in the omission cases is the distinction of duty.
Lethal conduct that violates a duty is (with mens rea and proximate cause) considered
criminal homicide, and lethal conduct that does not violate a duty is not considered
homicide. However, this distinction of duty in no way depends on the linguistic clas-
sification of act-vs.-omission. If a person violates a duty, and death results, it is
homicide whether or not the violation is accomplished by an act or an omission. In
"act"-homicide cases, the duty is normally a negative duty, a duty to forbear.
By contrast, in "omission"-homicide cases, the duty is conventionally de-
scribed as an affirmative duty, a duty to affirmatively act. Either way, however, it is
the violation of duty that is the key. If the legal duty is missing-for example, in
cases of self-defense, state executions or war-lethal "acts" are no more crimes than
are lethal "omissions" in the absence of legal duty. In other words, the law with re-
spect to acts and with respect to omissions can be wholly assimilated to one another
by simply recognizing the rule that "there is no crime without a duty," a rule that is
just as true of act-homicides as it is of omission-homicides. When guilt or innocence
is viewed as depending on whether there is breach of legal duty, rather than on lin-
guistic classifications of conduct, the supposed analytical dichotomy between acts
and omissions disappears. It is shown to be merely a distracting linguistic illusion.
" I All E.R. 821 (H.L. 1993).
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simply allowing his patient to die of his pre-existing condition,
the interloper is actively intervening to stop the doctor from
prolonging the patient's life, and such conduct cannot possibly
be categorised as an omission. ' 94 In other words, the interloper
obstructs a flow of medical services that the patient was entitled
to receive, or in any event would have received, while the doc-
tors merely cease to provide it. Because the interloper's conduct
modifies a course of events, instead of "simply allowing" events
to take their course, the interloper is properly understood to
have done an "act"-quite distinguishable from the mere omis-
sion of the doctors.
There is, however, a problem with drawing confident con-
clusions from the interloper example described in Airedale. The
problem is that, as portrayed in Airedale, the interloper differs
in a second (and highly prejudicial) respect from that of the pa-
tient's own doctors: The interloper had no business fiddling
with the medical machinery at all. Therefore, the interloper's
conduct in disconnecting the patient seems to be a purely gra-
tuitous or selfish infliction of harm. The same could presumably
also be said of the patient's covetous relative, motivated by the
inheritance. It is obvious enough how these factors of gratui-
tousness or selfishness might tend to pump our moral intuitions,
causing us to lean against exonerating the interloper or relative
no matter what. However, the presence of these factors also
raises at least the suspicion that the interloper/relative counter-
examples are rigged. Are we actually reacting to the repellant
factor of gratuitousness or selfishness, or is there really a sub-
stantive difference to be found in the distinction between ob-
structing a flow of medical care and merely ceasing to provide
one?
To test the genuineness of the Airedale distinction between
obstructing life support and merely "discontinuing" it, let us
suppose a hypothetical where the elements of gratuitousness and
selfishness are both removed from the equation. Suppose, for
example, that the life-saving machinery were disconnected, not
by a mere interloper, but by somebody who was legitimately
interested (albeit conflictually) in how these valuable resources
were used:
4Id. at 868 (Judgment of Lord Goffof Chieveley).
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A hospital administrator, pre-occupied with costs, slips
into the room of an impecunious patient and, against
doctors' orders, disconnects various life-sustaining de-
vices owned by the hospital. He does so because he is
concerned that the patient is rapidly consuming various
hospital resources, which neither the patient nor his es-
tate are able to pay for. Although the hospital is con-
tractually obligated to continue providing the devices
(i.e., the case is not yet "futile"), the administrator rea-
sons that it is economically preferable for the hospital to
breach its contract and risk paying whatever damages
might be assessed than to bear the certain cost of per-
forming its contract duties to the patient.
Even though the elements of gratuitous harm and personal
selfishness are now removed, the analysis should still probably
be the same as that of the interloper presupposed in Airedale.95
Again, what we have is conduct to obstruct medical care, a per-
son "actively intervening to stop the doctor from prolonging the
patient's life. 96 Since the hospital had a legal duty to the patient
at the time the administrator intervened, this is surely not a case
of "simp.ly allowing [the] patient to die of his pre-existing con-
dition, i.e., an omission. Rather, like the Airedale interloper,
the hospital administrator has "actively intervened to stop the
doctor" from providing needed care. When a person prevents
another from giving life-critical assistance, knowing that its ab-
sence will mean a high risk of death, the conclusion seems ines-
capable that the one who prevents it is a proximate causer of
death, if death in fact ensues.98 It does not exonerate the admin-
istrator that he did not personally have an affirtnative duty to the
patient. He had a negative duty, a duty to forbear from injuring
95 Compare Commonwealth v. Marcelli, 411 N.E.2d 270,271 (Mass. App. Ct.
1982) (stating that "[o]ne who intentionally prevents a third person from giving to
another aid necessary to prevent physical harm to him, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to the other by the absence of the aid which he prevented the
third person from giving") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 326 (1965)
with State ex teL Martin v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 739 (Ala. 1894) (stating that "[i]f the
aid in homicide can be shown to have put the deceased at a disadvantage, to have
deprived him of a single chance of life which but for it he would have had, he who
furnishes such aid is guilty, though it cannot be known or shown that the dead man,
in the absence thereof, would have availed himself of the chance").
% Airedale NHS Trust, 1 All E.R. at 868.
97 id.
98 See supra note 95.
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others by obstructing the flow of essential medical care to
which they were entitled.99
The analysis of the hospital administrator hypothetical may
be especially pertinent to analyzing a wrongful HMO denial.
The position of the errant hospital administrator is very similar
to that of an HMO functionary who effects a wrongful denial of
medical authorization to a patient who dies as a result. In both
situations what we have is conduct to prevent a flow of life-
prolonging medical care to a person entitled to receive it-con-
duct that Airedale says "cannot possibly be categorised as an
omission."'I If the HMO has a duty to provide a particular
treatment to a patient, the acts of HMO personnel that prevent
the fulfillment of that duty would seem to be as criminally cul-
pable as those of the hypothetical hospital administrator. Such
administrative conduct constitutes affirmative acts that foresee-
ably and directly deprive a person of life-critical treatments to
which the person is legally entitled. 01
99 See id. Concerning negative duties, see supra note 92.
.. Airedale NHS Trust, 1 All E.R. at 868.
101 Two pertinent variations on the hospital administrator hypothetical in the
text are:
Case 1: A hospital administrator tells an orderly to remove a respirator
that is sustaining the life of a certain elderly patient so that the device can
be used to save the life of a young man who has just been admitted fol-
lowing a serious accident. The elderly patient dies because the respirator is
removed.
Case 2: A hospital administrator is faced with an urgent need for two respi-
rators, one to sustain the life of a certain elderly patient and one to sustain
the life of a young man who has just been admitted after foolishly causing
himself to be injured in a serious accident. The administrator decides to as-
sign the hospital's sole functioning respirator to the elderly patient. The
young man dies for lack of a respirator.
It seems clear enough that Case 2 presents a stronger case for exonerating the ad-
ministrator than Case 1, but it is hard to say legalistically exactly why this should be
so. Of course, it would put a different cast on both of these cases if (analogous to for-
profit HMOs) the hospital's stockholders were economically affected by the choices
made by the administrator in allocating the respirators, leading the administrator to
make the selections based on what was best for them.
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C. The Limits on the HMO's Duties to Provide
Medical Care
Even though it is an affirmative act for an HMO function-
ary to cause a wrongful treatment denial, 0 2 the question of duty
is still crucially relevant to the analysis of criminal liability. For
unless the HMO has a legal duty to supply the treatment denied,
the functionary who effects the denial does not factually "pre-
vent" a flow to the patient of medical services that the patient
was entitled to receive; 10 none were flowing or promised in the
first place. To take an obvious example, suppose a seriously ill
patient needs life-sustaining treatment and, due to some sort of
clerical mistake, she applies to the wrong HMO, one with which
she has no contract. Certainly, a denial of treatment benefits by
a wrong HMO should not occasion criminal liability: In such a
case the HMO is merely a bystander and, at common law, a
mere bystander generally has no duty at all to save others in
need.'4 Logically, too, it would seem that exactly the same rea-
soning ought to apply if a patient applies to her own HMO for a
treatment not covered by the HMO agreement---"no duty, no
guilt."'05 Accordingly, the question of criminal liability seems
to turn, crucially, on the scope of the HMO's duty to provide
the care that the HMO functionary refused to authorize.
The legal duties of HMOs to provide medical care are
based on the agreements they make with their subscribers. The
scope of the HMO's duties is presumably limitable by the terms
of those agreements, and they can vary considerably in their
details.1 6 Different agreements may have exclusions for differ-
ent kinds of conditions and experimental therapies, as well as
102 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 88-101.
io. See supra text accompanying note 100.
104 see, e.g., Albright v. State, 280 So. 2d 186, 190-91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973)
(upholding a demurrer to an indictment that failed to allege the status relationship
that gave rise to a duty to act); People v. Oliver, 258 Cal. Rptr. 138, 142 (Ct. App.
1989) (noting that there is no legal duty to render aid in absence of a special relation-
ship); Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1064 (Md. 1979). See generally DRESSLER, su-
pra note I, at 86-87 (describing general rule of liability for failure to act); LAFAVE &
ScOTr, supra note 1, at 203, 211-12 (indicating there is no legal duty to aid another in
peril). p l.0 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 71-87 (describing the "no duty, no
guilt" analysis of Barber).
106 Although it is possible that statutory or common law regulations might
declare certain attempts at treatment exclusions to be void as against public policy,
such limitations on -MOs' freedom of contract are beyond the scope of this article.
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differing decision procedures, payment conditions, arbitration
provisions, and other variations. Moreover, an IMO's contrac-
tual duty to provide care does not necessarily run to the point of
"futility," as did the doctors' duties in Barber. Instead, the
HMO may describe the outer limits of its duties in less compre-
hensive terms, for example by committing itself only to provide
those tests and treatments that are "medically necessary"' 0 7 or
not "experimental."'' 0 8
To the extent that HMOs contract to assume less extensive
duties to provide medical care than those imposed on physi-
cians, they make it almost inevitable that severe disappoint-
ments will occur. The resulting discrepancies in legal duties
make it almost inevitable that occasions will arise in which a
patient's physician will be duty-bound to recommend or order
medical treatments but the IMO will have no duty to pay for
them. The tensions and dissatisfactions that will emerge from
these situations should be plain.
For present purposes, however, we need not examine the
variations on the HMOs' contractual duties in detail. Although
contractual terms limiting HIMOs' duties will present factual
and interpretive questions in each particular case, their exis-
107 See, e.g., Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 823 F. Supp.
1050, 1058 (ED.N.Y. 1993) (emphasis added):
Further, Oxford refers to a provision in [The Handbook] entitled 'Supple-
mental Medical Expenses Benefits: Covered Expenses,' which reads: A
Covered Expense is the lesser of the Usual Charge or the Reasonable
Charge for any of the services and supplies listed below. Such services and
supplies must be recommended or approved by a Doctor as medically nec-
essary and incurred while insurance or an Extension of Benefits is in force.
They must also be medically necessary, in our judgment, for the treatment
of a Covered Person's Injury or Sickness for which insurance is provided
under the policy.
See also Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding
HMO contract limitation to that which is "medically necessary"); Farley v. Benefit
Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1992) (using "medically necessary");
Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D. N.J. 1989) (using "'rea-
sonably necessary' for medical care"); Anderson v. HMO Nebraska, Inc., 505
N.W.2d 700, 704 (Neb. 1993) (stating that the HMO was empowered by the contract
to determine "medical necessity," which included a consideration of what treatments
were "most cost effective").
108 See, e.g., Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D.
N.J. 1989); Scalanmandre, 823 F. Supp. at 1061-62 (implying that if treatment was
experimental, it would not be covered under the plan).
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tence does not in any way foreclose the threshold question un-
der discussion here, namely, whether the ordinary definitions of
existing law make it a criminal act for HMO personnel to order
a wrongful benefits denial knowing it will probably lead to
death or serious injury. For purposes of this question it is only
necessary that a judge or jury be able to find that the HMO in
question had a contractual obligation to approve the treatment
that was denied and that the HMO did not follow its own con-
tractual rules, so that the denial can be considered "wrongful."
IV. MENTAL CULPABILITY
Like other homicides, lethal administrative conduct on the
part of HMO functionaries and managers is criminal only if the
requisite mental culpability is present. In this section, three as-
pects of mental culpability will be discussed: knowledge of the
risks to the patient; knowledge of the legal duty; and the prob-
lem of getting proof of the requisite mental culpability.
A. Knowledge of the Risks
The mental culpability for homicide varies with the degree
of the crime charged. It ranges from the mental states of inten-
tion or purpose to cause death (typically murder), through
recklessness regarding the risk of death (typically involuntary
manslaughter), down to the minimum mental culpability for
guilt, criminal negligence.1°9 "The doing of an act, or imperfect
performance of a duty, toward a person who is helpless, which
naturally and ordinarily leads to the death of such person, is
murder, if death or grievous bodily harm is intended; and man-
slaughter, if the cause is negligence."" 0
", See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02 & 210.0 -. 4 (Official Draft 1962)
(defining four states of culpability and requisite mental states for the commission of
criminal homicide, respectively); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 15.05 & 125.00-.27 (McKin-
ney 1998) (defining culpable mental states and the different types of homicides under
New York law, respectively). See generally LAFAVE & Scott, supra note 1, at 214
(describing the various mental states in defining crimes); DRESSLER, supra note 1, at
467-68 (describing general principles of degrees of mental culpability for criminal
homicide). Classifications and designations of homicides vary considerably from
state to state, see LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 642-46, 652, 668-69. The sum-
mary in the text primarily reflects the Model Penal Code prototype.
10 People v. Montecino, 152 P.2d 5, 13 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (quoting I
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW 714 (12th ed. 1932)).
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Despite the strong economic incentives that HMOs have to
remove net-negative subscribers from their rolls as quickly as
feasible, we will pass over the possibility that these incentives
might motivate treatment denials for the conscious purpose of
* shortening life. This does not, however, eliminate the possibility
of a murder charge for an HMO denial. In general, the law
treats the result of an act as "intended" if the act is done with an
awareness that the result is practically certain to occur."' This
sort of "intention" might be found, for example, in a case where
an HMO medical reviewer denied authorization for a life-
critical treatment with the knowledge that the patient's progno-
sis would be very grim without it.
Moreover, even a merely "reckless" homicide can be
treated as murder if the circumstances manifest extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life.112 Suppose, for example, an
HMO manager makes a decision to deny life-critical medical
care for essentially financial reasons, or on the ground that the
patient's life is not simply "worth it"--due to advanced age,
poor overall condition, mental infirmity, net-negative economic
prognosis, or other invidious discrimination. Such a denial may
very plausibly be considered to evince a sufficient indifference
to the value of human life to support a charge of murder.
In addition to possible murder charges, lesser degrees of
homicide might apply to deaths that are caused with lesser
11 See, e.g., People v. Stanciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (i11. 1992) (stating
that to show intent to commit murder "it is sufficient to show that the defendants
voluntarily and willfully committed an act, the natural tendency of which is to de-
stroy another's life. Intent may be inferred from the character of defendant's acts as
well as the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense" (citation
omitted)); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(b)(ii) & 210.2(l)(a) (Official
Draft 1962) (discussing "knowingly' committed culpable conduct and indicating that
murder is committed either purposely or knowingly, respectively). See generally
DREsSLER, supra note 1, at 105-06 (defining "intentionally"); LAFAVE & ScowT,
supra note 1, at 216-18 (describing "intent" and "knowledge" as related to crimes).
112 See, e.g., People v. Burden, 140 Cal. Rptr. 282, 291-92 (Ct. App. 1977)
(affirming conviction for second-degree murder for neglect of child whose death was
caused by malnutrition and dehydration); People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y.
1983) (finding defendant acted with "depraved indifference to human life" by firing a
gun in a crowded bar and by firing at an unknown person for no explained reason);
Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1946) (upholding murder conviction for
defendant who killed another while playing Russian poker due to his wicked disposi-
tion); see also Pallis v. State, 26 So. 2d 339 (Ala. 1899) (stating that "if the... ne-
glect is of a dangerous kind, it is murder"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(l)(B) (Offi-
cial Draft 1962) (enumerating the action and situations where the actor will be pre-
sumed to have acted recklessly and indifferently).
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mental culpabilities. For example, a denial of benefits that is
ordered with a mental state of "recklessness" should attract at
least a charge of involuntary manslaughter. 1 3 The influential
Model Penal Code defines recklessness as occurring when a
person "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk" if the disregard "involves a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe" under
the circumstances. !1 4 It defines the still lesser culpability of
criminal negligence as arising when a person "should be aware
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk" and yet acts in disregard
of that risk. 15 When a medical reviewer who ought to know the
risks decides to cause a denial of essential medical treatment,
and the denial triggers a patient's death, there would seem to be
at least a case of negligence or recklessness and, therefore, a
basis for charging negligent homicide or involuntary man-
slaughter. If the person who causes the denial does so with al-
most certain knowledge that it will lead to the patient's death, it
would seem to be one of the degrees of murder.
B. Knowledge of the Duty
Although knowledge or foreseeability that an action will
have potentially lethal consequences is a standard element of
criminal liability for death, it is not so clear that the HMO
functionary need know the nature or exact scope of the HMO's
legal duty. In the typical case, of course, the HMO medical re-
viewer almost certainly ought to know at least the general tenor
of the HMO's duty to the patient; before presuming to order a
denial of treatment, she should have at a minimum made herself
aware of the terms of the subscriber's agreement, the patient's
diagnosis, the treatment requested, and whether the HMO's
protocols describe such treatments as indicated for persons with
113 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(a) (Official Draft 1962) (stating
that a criminal homicide is manslaughter if committed recklessly); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.15(l) (McKinney 1998) (defining second degree manslaughter).
114 § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft 1962); cf. Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55
N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1944) (holding that reckless conduct is an act or an omission
whereby the act or omission will lead to a high degree of likelihood that harm will
result to another).
115 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Official Draft 1962); cf State v. Wil-
liams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that regardless of the individ-
ual's mental state, if the conduct does not measure up to conduct required of a rea-
sonable person, the individual is guilty of negligence).
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the patient's condition. With this information at hand, she
should be able to infer the HMO's probable duties, as well.
At any rate, the preeminent case for an HMO-homicide
prosecution would be one in which the HMO's decision-makers
were consciously aware that a treatment denial would not likely
be upheld in court if the IMO were (or could be"16) sued, but
they went ahead and ordered the denial anyway-perhaps fig-
uring that a chance of being forced to pay civil damages in the
future was a financially better risk than the certainty of paying
right away.'
7
Suppose, however, that an HMO medical reviewer was
truly under the impression that the HMO had no legal duty to
authorize treatment in the particular case. Suppose, for example,
the reviewer orders a denial of medical treatment while fully
aware of the mortal risk that denial poses to the patient, but she
honestly, albeit erroneously, concludes that the HMO's contract
does not cover the requested treatment because it is not, in her
judgment, "medically necessary." If a judge or jury later con-
cludes that the treatment was "medically necessary," based on a
trial with expert testimony, is the HMO reviewer guilty of
criminal homicide for the death that ensued, or does she have an
excuse because it was her honest judgment that the treatment
was not necessary?' 1 8
On one hand, this misconception of the HMO's legal duty
would not appear to be a simple case of "mistake of fact,"
where an honest error or ignorance serves as a defense because
the error negates the mental state that is an essential element of
116 Bear in mind, the Federal ERISA severely limits private lawsuits in many
instances. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
117 See inifra Part IV.C (including a discussion of obtaining proof of such a
conscious awareness).
118 Lest one think this situation is unrealistic, consider: "Last year a Medicare
carier in the St. Paul area rejected a claim--three times-as 'medically unnecessary'
even though the patient died within an hour of arriving at the hospital." Daniel Eisen-
berg, Critical Condition, TM, Jan. 31, 2000, at 52, 54. Such a thing can easily hap-
pen. Suppose, for example, a terminally ill patient decides she wants to die at home-
"there is nothing more they can do." A few days after going home she has a severe
respiratory crisis and her distraught family, in panic, call an ambulance. Is an expen-
sive trip back to the hospital "medically necessary," even though it would, at best,
only let her live a few more days, until some later crisis finally brings the end? More
generally, a cost-conscious HMO might ask, when is it ever "medically necessary" to
perform extensive therapy, other than palliative, on people lingering at the edge of
death? These end-of-life situations pose legal questions of duty that stubbornly re-
main even after all of the medical facts are known.
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the crime in question.1 9 On the contrary, the reviewer fully
knew the factual character of what she was doing. She knew
that her action was almost certain to have fatal consequences
(the mental element of criminal homicide) but, because she
misinterpreted or misapplied the HMO contract, she thought
that such lethal behavior was, on her part, legally permissible.
The meager law available from the criminal omissions
context also does not well support the idea that ignorance of a
legal duty is an exonerating excuse when a person breaches the
duty and another's death foreseeably results.12 For example, the
avaricious uncle who allowed his nephew to drown'2' would
probably not be allowed to claim he did not know that guardian-
ship carried with it a duty to save his nephew from accidental
death. 122 Likewise, the hospital administrator who, pre-occupied
with costs, disconnected a patient from life support'2 should
presumably not be heard to claim that he mistakenly thought
that, like a hotel, the hospital had no legal duty to accommodate
people who could no longer pay their bills. Perhaps such claims
of ignorance would not be regarded as reasonable mistakes in
any event, but the point here is that, reasonable or not, there
seems to be no legal basis for thinking they even would be
heard at all. In sum, the existing criminal law seems, if any-
thing, to weigh against giving a legal excuse where the HMO
functionary errs in interpreting the legal duty of the HMO.
1 9 See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 1, at 405-07 (discussing how ignorance
or mistake as a matter of fact or law is a defense if it negates a mental state required
to establish the crime); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (Official Draft
1962) (stating that ignorance or mistake is a defense if it "negatives the purpose,
knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element
of the offense"). Knowledge of legal duty is not, however, ordinarily an element of
the crimes of homicide. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1-.4 (Official Draft
1962). Furthermore, "a reasonable belief on the part of the defendant that the law is
such that his conduct does not constitute an offense.. .[n]ormally .. .is irrelevant...
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.04 cmt. 3 (1985).
12 See LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 1, at 207-08 (discussing whether liabil-
ity may be imposed when defendant is unaware of the facts giving rise to the duty).
But compare the narrow exception recognized in Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957) (holding that ignorance of a legal duty could be a constitutional defense to an
omission-offense if nothing in the circumstances gave any warning or notice that any
such duty might exist at all).
122 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
'z See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 208.
12- See supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
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On the other hand, it would be very harsh if people who are
required to make life-or-death decisions in their daily work
were held to do so at entirely their own peril in the event they
were to misapply a contract. It would be not only harsh, but it
would be a bad policy for the public, as well. After all, we
should not as a society want to drive reasonable and conscien-
tious people out of the HMO business entirely. That is, how-
ever, exactly what we ought to expect to happen if errors in
medical judgment, or medico-economic judgment, were to put
the decision-makers in personal peril of prosecution.
When lethal administrative errors occur in the HMO ap-
proval process, it therefore seems to make sense to allow an ac-
commodation for cases of good faith mistake, similar to that
allowed in cases of mistaken self-defense. Under the law of
self-defense, it can be legal to kill a perfectly innocent person
who is posing no menace to anyone IZ4 provided that the killer
actually believes'2 that the use of deadly force is necessary for
self-protection from serious harm or death.126 That is, the law
leaves a margin of safety to allow people to act in borderline
cases.
Similarly, whether or not a treatment for a particular con-
dition is "medically necessary" is a class of judgment that
124 See, e.g., People v. Adams, 491 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (finding
defendant not guilty of involuntary manslaughter when a bullet he fired passed
through the body of an attacker and killed an innocent victim). See generally LAFAVE
& Scowr, supra note 1, at 457-58 (indicating that self-defense requires the defendant
to honestly believe in the necessity of using force, even if he is mistaken in that be-
lief).
125 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(b) (Official Draft 1962) (deadly force not
justifiable unless actor believes such force is necessary for self-protection). Most say
the defendant must also reasonably believe. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)
(McKinney 1998) (requiring reasonable belief in a reasonable necessity of deadly
force); see also United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating
rule requiring reasonable belief of imminent peril); People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41,
50-51 (N.Y. 1986) (concluding that an objective standard should be used to deter-
mine if the actor reasonably believed use of deadly force was necessary). See gener-
ally LAFAVE & Scowr, supra note 1, at 457-58 (discussing the requirement that the
defendant's belief in the necessity of using force be reasonable and honest).
126 See LAFAVE & Scowr, supra note 1, at 457-58. There may also be other
conditions attached to the defense, such as the unavailability of a safe retreat or that
the killer not be the original aggressor, but none of these conditions changes the fact
that the law of self-defense justifies the killing of innocent people under certain cir-
cumstances, one of which is a (reasonable) belief in the necessity. See generally id. at
459-61 (noting what constitutes lawful and unlawful force and the necessity to re-
treat).
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surely has many borderline cases, where the conclusions and
judgments of reasonable experts may differ. Surely, too, there
are many cases when the medical necessity is not borderline,
situations in which it is almost certain that certain well-
established treatments will help and, without them, the patient
will die or grievously suffer. In the borderline situations, the
case for allowing a legal excuse for wrongful denials seems
strong. In the non-borderline situations, however, where the
reasonable persons in the field would find the "medical neces-
sity" to be clear, the matter is entirely different; there is no
more warrant for excusing a lethal "error of judgment" in such
cases than there is to excuse the lethal error in judgment of a
truck driver in traffic who purposely steers onto a crowded
sidewalk to avoid being late 27 Once a jury finds that reason-
able people with suitable educational background and training
could not differ on medical necessity, conviction would seem
proper as a matter of course.
C. Getting Proof of Mental Culpability
The decisions of HMOs in individual cases and the policies
and directions that guide those decisions are normally made in-
ternally; the elements that go into these decisions, policies and
direction, be they proper or improper-culpable or not-lie
largely outside the ken of external observers. Nevertheless, in
prosecutions of lower level medical reviewers and similar per-
sonnel, proof of the crucial mental elements of criminal liabil-
ity-such as knowledge of the deadly risk of a denial-should
pose no special prosecutorial difficulties. The accused could
hardly deny having had knowledge of the key facts that show
awareness of the risk: the patient's condition and prognosis, the
recommendations of the treating physician, the HMO's internal
guidelines, and customary medical practices. If a medical re-
viewer were to maintain that she withheld medical treatment
without such knowledge, it would be tantamount to admitting
extreme recklessness. Getting proof of the managerial direction
and mental culpabilities of people higher up in the organization
is more intricate, but essentially the task is the same as that of
127 See People v. Gomez, 478 N.E.2d 759 (N.Y. 1985) (affirming defendant's
conviction for murder based on an objective assessment of the degree of risk pre-
sented when he erroneously drove car on sidewalk killing two children).
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obtaining mental-state evidence in any case of organization-
based criminality.
Suppose, for example, a prosecutor is looking for evidence
to show that an HMO's management has deliberately put poli-
cies into place to cause time lags in the approval process for
certain tests and treatments-with the foreseeable effect that
patients having certain conditions and ailments would often not
get approvals for treatment in time to make a life-saving differ-
ence. Remember that a relatively short delay of treatment can be
enough to shorten a life.128 To obtain evidence of deliberate de-
lay policies, a prosecutor could first bring in the medical re-
viewers who were immediately and visibly responsible for de-
laying or denying the authorization of life-critical treatments in
one or more cases. The legal accusations and personal risk of
conviction could be explained, along with the advantages of co-
operating. Specifically, the prosecutor could request that, in ex-
change for leniency or immunity, these lower-level functionar-
ies provide testimony with respect to the internal policies of
their company, instructions received from their superiors, the
performance criteria by which employees are judged, the pat-
terns of approval and denial fostered among the medical review
staff, and the like.
By working "up the ladder" with successive interviews of
this sort, a resourceful and motivated prosecution could take the
case right up to the high-level locus of actual policy formation.
In fact, getting the needed evidence of managerial-level culpa-
bility may be even easier in the case of HMOs than in other
multiparty criminal cases because the lower-level personnel in-
volved are likely to be less nonchalant about the prospect of
imprisonment than more traditional criminal actors; they may,
that is, be relatively more amenable to cooperating with the
government. 129
12 See Ware, Jr. et al., supra note 22, at 1043-44 (discussing the effect of
time on health).
129 For my own part, it should be said, I do not approve of these essentially
extortionate governmental tactics for obtaining evidence, and I do not personally
consider the evidence obtained by them to be especially reliable. Accord United
States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the use of such
techniques violates federal laws against bribing witnesses), rev'd, United States v.
Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999). However, the use of investigative duress
to collect evidence is apparently commonplace, and most American courts, including
the U.S. Supreme Court, apparently regard such governmental behavior as accept-
able. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. de-
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POSTSCRIPT
When people do things that they know are almost certain to
have lethal consequences, and death results, criminal prosecu-
tion for homicide is normally called for. The existing criminal
law provides no obvious reason why there should be an excep-
tion for actions by HMO functionaries who prevent their com-
panies from performing their legal duties to authorize and pay
for critical medical care. Under the law's prevailing categories
and definitions, prosecutions of HMO personnel for wrongful
treatment denials appears to be logically indicated in cases
where death or serious medical injury was foreseeable, and
death actually results. To prosecute in such cases would be a
straightforward application of the principle that, when death is
foreseeable, lethal behavior is a crime. The fact that the lethal
behavior may be a "rational" response to pressing economic
forces would not, under ordinary criminal law, constitute an ex-
cuse or defense.
However, the economic pressures that bear on HMOs and
their managements are not entirely an unintended consequence
of the HMO structure or unanticipated accidents that no one
could foresee, nor do they work in isolation on the HMO indus-
try. The view is apparently held by many that fewer of our re-
sources should go to medical treatments, so that more will be
left over for other things. 130 In any case, the economic pressures
on HMOs do not arise ex nihilo. Rather, they are the manifesta-
tions of values and priorities that are exerted by society as a
whole. The H.MO industry only happens to be the locus where
nied, 527 U.S. 1024 (1999); cf. Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000)
(adopting discovery procedures to assure full disclosure when jailhouse informants
are used as witnesses). See Frank 0. Bowman, II, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow:
A Year of Judicial Revolt on "Substantial Assistance" Departures Follows a Decade
of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 24 ST-rSON L. REV. 7, 64 (1999). At least it is a better
way to obtain evidence than the use of physical torture, which the Supreme Court has
also recently let stand. See People v. Hanna, 567 N.W.2d 12 (Mich. App. 1997), cert.
denied, Hanna v. Michigan, 120 S. Ct. 970 (2000) (upholding infliction of temporar-
ily incapacitating pain in order to permit withdrawal of blood sample).
" As one commentator stated this point, somewhat disparagingly, "if Granny
were dead then Johnny could go to college." Nancy W. Dickey, Euthanasia: A Con-
cept Whose Time Has Come? 8 ISSUES IN LAw & MED. 521 (Mar. 22, 1993). Alterna-
tively, one could say, "if Granny were dead, then 10 very sick children, currently
uninsured, could receive treatments that would save their lives." A third option might
be: "if Granny were dead, then her health insurance company would have higher
earnings-per-share" These issues are not simple.
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these pressures have a particularly visible impact. If HMO man-
agers were in fact never influenced by the economic pressures
they feel to contain the costs of medical treatments, if they
never said "no" to the less promising therapies in less salvage-
able cases, they would not be doing the job that society has ar-
guably charged them with doing.
In short, by allowing and even encouraging the delivery of
medical services via the modem HMO/managed care format,
society may be saying that it wants its medical care to be pro-
vided and financed under conditions that cannot possibly pay
the cost of saving every life from avoidable foreshortening. If
so, then it is society in aggregate which has decided that some
"life-saving" must be foregone, that some lives are simply not
worth the cost, and that, in consequence, lethal treatment deci-
sions must sometimes be made. The people on the front lines of
these fatal decisions are, in the final analysis, only doing the
bidding of others.
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote: "The life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience."' 131 In other words, if
the application of legal rules is not "experienced" as being right,
if legal outcomes do not "feel" right when put into practice,
then the logic must yield to the experiences that contradict it. If
the idea of homicide prosecutions for HMO managers seems
repellant, even when they appear to be logically indicated by
the existing categories of the law, then something must be
wrong with the law. There must be something additional and
decisive in the mix of considerations that affects the way that
we "experience" such results.
In the case of homicide and IMOs, the most obvious "ad-
ditional" factors are the considerations of social position and
distinction, which can subtly enter human moral calculus.
Criminal sanctions in this country are not primarily aimed at
people like HMO managers and administrative personnel, but
are mostly intended for a very different segment of society.1
32
13 1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW I (1923).
132 For example, it has been pointed out that approximately 70-75% of the
people locked away in the New York State's prison system come from just seven
neighborhoods in New York City-among the poorest in the state. See Alexandra
Marks, N.Y. Prison Religion Program Helps Turn Lives Around, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Mar. 1I, 1997, at 1; Susan S. Lang, Help For Neighborhoods, CHILDREN
TODAY, Dec. 22, 1993, at 16 (discussing how neighborhood alliances may be a solu-
tion to problems in the poorest areas of New York); Francis X. Clines, Ex-Inmates
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As long as the punishments for homicide are limited to the
"kinds" of conduct and people to which they are usually ap-
plied, the rest of us can live tolerably with the deliberate inflic-
tions of human suffering that their application entails. When it
is suggested, however, that these punishments be applied more
evenly, extending also to the lethal activity of classes that the
legislator may not have envisioned, we are tempted to suspect
that the law's logic has gone awry. We are put on the alert to
find ways to make exceptions.
Perhaps, however, this particular dissonance between expe-
rience and law goes deeper, lying beyond the reach of resolution
by mere exceptions. Perhaps, instead, it is that the purposeful
infliction of human suffering is itself a morally dubious way to
deal with social problems, and only when we contemplate ex-
tending it beyond the usual targets do we truly comprehend its
horror.
Urge Return to Areas of Crime to Help, N.Y. Tms, Dec. 23, 1992, at Al. Cf. People
v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660, 664 n.1 (N.Y. 1980), observing that there
are "tenable arguments for and against" applying the existing homicide laws to deaths
caused in manufacturing operations.
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